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darren_cormier's review against another edition
5.0
This book examines Supreme Court Justice Steven Breyer's landmark dissent in the 2015 case Glossip vs. Gross in which the constitutionality of the lethal injection combination used in the botched execution of an Oklahoma inmate was called into question. The case contested that the use of the drug midazalom constituted cruel and unusual punishment, thus violating the Eighth Amendment, due to the drug's inability to fully sedate the accused. Midazolam has a ceiling affect, meaning the affect will reach a certain height regardless of how much extra is administered: using more will not further sedate the patient if a counteracting drug is then injected, as is the case with a three drug injection used in lethal injection capital punishment cases.
The Supreme Court ruled 5-4 to not stay the execution of Richard Glossip for the murder of the owner of a hotel, with Justice Samuel Alito writing the court's opinion that any inmates in a capital case must provide a known and available alternative if they believe the means being used are cruel and unusual. The onus is on the inmate to determine the most humane way to end his own life.
A dissenting opinion was written by Justice Sonia Sotomayor, joined by Breyer. However, Breyer went further in a second dissenting opinion (joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg) calling into question the constitutionality of the death penalty itself, hence the description above as a landmark dissent. A justice had very rarely (if ever) called into question the constitutionality of capital punishment across the board in an opinion before. Justices had called into question the limits to which the death penalty could be used, over the years ruling it could not be used in cases that did not involve murder; could not be used on juveniles; could not be used on individuals of severely limited intelligence, among other limitations. Justices after retiring had come out as against the death penalty, but not in the professional capacity as justices.
The editor provides the logic for both sides of this particular case, and also provides a history of the death penalty's evolution in the United States. In early 17th century Massachusetts Bay Colony, thirteen crimes were punishable by death, including idolatry, witchcraft, sodomy, adultery, man-stealing, and murder. (Early Mass Bay Colony's penal code was, obviously, heavily influenced by the Old Testament.) Currently 19 states have abolished the death penalty and less than 10 states have actively put someone to death over the last five years. It is so rarely used as to meet the unusual standard of the Eighth Amendment.
Breyer's dissent delves into the delays of capital cases, the efficacy of the punishment, its problematic adjudication--how often someone found guilty in a capital case is later exonerated; how the imposition of the death penalty is limited to not just a handful of states but a handful of counties, implicating the capriciousness of the district attorneys and prosecutors, implying that its pursuit as punishment is arbitrary, due to the whims and biases of the prosecutors themselves. The book provides evidence (and further research in the endnotes) that the arguments that capital punishment serves as a deterrent of future crime does not hold up. The advent of the death penalty does not prevent future crimes, whereas studies have shown that life without parole sentences do have a tangible impact as a deterrent.
(It does not provide the emotional impact of the continued use of the death penalty or the economic impact of its continued use; the economics are mentioned in the endnotes by the editor. Both are, accordingly to this review, applicable reasons for capital punishments abolition.)
In short, this book provides the legal and historical research and evidence of the unconstitutionality of the death penalty.
The Supreme Court ruled 5-4 to not stay the execution of Richard Glossip for the murder of the owner of a hotel, with Justice Samuel Alito writing the court's opinion that any inmates in a capital case must provide a known and available alternative if they believe the means being used are cruel and unusual. The onus is on the inmate to determine the most humane way to end his own life.
A dissenting opinion was written by Justice Sonia Sotomayor, joined by Breyer. However, Breyer went further in a second dissenting opinion (joined by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg) calling into question the constitutionality of the death penalty itself, hence the description above as a landmark dissent. A justice had very rarely (if ever) called into question the constitutionality of capital punishment across the board in an opinion before. Justices had called into question the limits to which the death penalty could be used, over the years ruling it could not be used in cases that did not involve murder; could not be used on juveniles; could not be used on individuals of severely limited intelligence, among other limitations. Justices after retiring had come out as against the death penalty, but not in the professional capacity as justices.
The editor provides the logic for both sides of this particular case, and also provides a history of the death penalty's evolution in the United States. In early 17th century Massachusetts Bay Colony, thirteen crimes were punishable by death, including idolatry, witchcraft, sodomy, adultery, man-stealing, and murder. (Early Mass Bay Colony's penal code was, obviously, heavily influenced by the Old Testament.) Currently 19 states have abolished the death penalty and less than 10 states have actively put someone to death over the last five years. It is so rarely used as to meet the unusual standard of the Eighth Amendment.
Breyer's dissent delves into the delays of capital cases, the efficacy of the punishment, its problematic adjudication--how often someone found guilty in a capital case is later exonerated; how the imposition of the death penalty is limited to not just a handful of states but a handful of counties, implicating the capriciousness of the district attorneys and prosecutors, implying that its pursuit as punishment is arbitrary, due to the whims and biases of the prosecutors themselves. The book provides evidence (and further research in the endnotes) that the arguments that capital punishment serves as a deterrent of future crime does not hold up. The advent of the death penalty does not prevent future crimes, whereas studies have shown that life without parole sentences do have a tangible impact as a deterrent.
(It does not provide the emotional impact of the continued use of the death penalty or the economic impact of its continued use; the economics are mentioned in the endnotes by the editor. Both are, accordingly to this review, applicable reasons for capital punishments abolition.)
In short, this book provides the legal and historical research and evidence of the unconstitutionality of the death penalty.